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Applying metaethical and normative claims of moral relativism to 
(shareholder and stakeholder) models of corporate governance  
Abstract 
There has, in recent decades, been considerable scholarship regarding the moral aspects of 
corporate governance, and differences in corporate governance practices around the world 
have been widely documented and investigated. In such a context the claims associated with 
moral relativism are relevant. The purpose of this paper is to provide a detailed consideration 
of how the metaethical and normative claims of moral relativism in particular can be applied 
to corporate governance. This objective is achieved, firstly, by reviewing what is meant by 
metaethical moral relativism and identifying two ways in which the metaethical claim can be 
assessed. The possibility of a single, morally superior model of corporate governance is 
subsequently considered through an analysis of prominent works justifying the shareholder 
and stakeholder approaches, together with a consideration of academic agreement in this area. 
The paper then draws on the work of David Wong (Moral Relativity, University of California 
Press, 1984; Relativism, in P. Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics, Blackwell, 1993; Natural 
Moralities: A Defense of Pluralistic Relativism, Oxford University Press, 2006), firstly in 
providing an argument supporting metaethical moral relativism, and secondly regarding 
values of tolerance and/or accommodation that can contribute to the normative claim. The 
paper concludes by proposing an argument that it is morally wrong to impose a model of 
corporate governance where there are differences in moral judgements relevant to corporate 
governance, or to interfere with a model in similar circumstances, and closes with 
consideration of the argument’s implications.    
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Applying metaethical and normative claims of moral relativism to 
corporate governance 
 
The idea of moral relativism: that morality varies across and/or is relative to different 
societies and cultures can be traced as far back as the pre-Socratic philosopher Protagoras 
(490-420 B.C.). Although this idea may not have garnered a great deal of philosophical 
attention until the twentieth century (Gowans, 2012), it remains a central issue in moral 
philosophy (Holmes, 2007). From an anthropological perspective, influential studies such as 
those by Sumner (1906) and Benedict (1934) highlighted differences in cultural norms, 
customs and beliefs in different societies around the world, and have suggested a cultural 
relativism. The continued mixing of societies, the exchange of ideas facilitated by 
globalisation, and relationships between people maintaining differing judgements, can all 
lead intuitively to a questioning of the universality and/or objectivity of any particular 
morality. Philosophically, however, moral relativism has been subjected to substantial 
criticism. Bernard Williams, for example, regarded it as the “anthropologist’s heresy, 
possibly the most absurd view to have been advanced even in moral philosophy” (1972, p. 
34). Others (such as Moody-Adams (1997), Postow (1979) and Ross (1930)) have pointed 
out problems related to different aspects of moral relativism, and consequences of accepting 
moral relativism that run counter to several commonly-held moral intuitions (Rachels, 1999). 
Much of the criticism of moral relativism is concerned with the thesis that morality in general 
is relative in some sense (see, for example, Koehn’s (2013) and Dierksmeier & Celano’s 
(2012) arguments for a universal ethic of virtue applicable to global business), rather than 
with applications to specific moral issues. Although we may not have a complete 
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understanding of the nature of morality in general, the claims of moral relativism continue to 
have relevance for specific moral issues, ranging from claims for universal human rights, to 
issues such as Female Circumcision / Genital Mutilation (Kopelman, 1994), Polygamy and 
Same-sex Marriage. Dilemmas associated with such issues reflect differing moral judgements 
amongst different societies or communities, and the question of whether a particular moral 
judgement should apply universally (and, if so, which one?). This applicability is no less true 
in the business sphere. With the rise of multi-national corporations and international business, 
it has become common in undergraduate business studies to examine cultural differences, 
often referring to the work of Hofstede (1983, 2001) or S. H. Schwartz (1999). These cultural 
differences are themselves considered to reflect different ‘value orientations’ and Hofstede 
acknowledges a culturally relativist position (2001, p. 15). Other specific issues include those 
of universal rights to work, universal working conditions, child labour, bribery and nepotism. 
Donaldson and Dunfee’s (1999a, 1999b) Integrated Social Contracts Theory, with its 
postulated ‘hypernorms’ and ‘moral free space’ can also be considered to be an application of 
the universal-relative distinction to multi-national corporations1. 
Much of the existing business ethics research that incorporates moral relativism refers to 
Forsyth’s (1980) typology of ethical ideologies, focuses on ethical positions that may inform 
individual judgements and decision-making, and investigates these in a range of different 
contexts and in relation to different issues. Forsyth et al. (2008) conducted a meta-analysis on 
81 separate studies using this typology; some more recent examples of such research include 
Lu and Lu (2010), Hastings and Finegan (2011), Nayir and Herzig (2012) and Marta et al. 
(2012). Although Forsyth’s typology does include a dimension for relativism, his descriptions 
of moral relativism refer to emphasising situational or contextual factors over moral 
principles, and thus correspond more to moral particularism than to moral relativism2.  
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Business ethics research that explicitly incorporates moral relativism without using Forsyth’s 
typology is, however, far less common. Lewis and Unerman (1999) provide an example with 
regard to Social and Environmental Reporting, Baker (2006) discusses relativism and 
accounting ethics in general terms, and West (2009) argues for corporate governance 
convergence to be considered through the lens of moral relativism. The latter issue presents a 
useful area for examination, for several reasons. Firstly, corporate governance is of moral 
concern (Collier and  Roberts, 2001; Potts and  Matuszewski, 2004; Rossouw and  Sison, 
2006; Ryan et al., 2010). Secondly, there are a variety of differing practices of corporate 
governance around the world. Thirdly, while not all of the differences in corporate 
governance practice may reflect moral differences, some important moral differences can be 
identified and traced to different moral philosophies.   
The term ‘corporate governance’ can be used in a number of different ways, serving different 
contexts. In some cases it refers strictly to certain internal structures of corporations, 
particularly those that are associated with directing and controlling the corporation. However, 
an exclusive focus on internal structures ignores the underlying relationship between the 
corporation and other groups in society. A broader view of corporate governance includes 
issues such as Corporate Social Responsibility, addressing the relationship that corporations 
maintain with their communities and the environment (consider, for example, Cadbury’s 
view that “Corporate governance is concerned with holding the balance between economic 
and social goals and between the individual and communal goals.” (quoted in Clarke (2004, 
p. 2)). Within this broader understanding of corporate governance, questions regarding to 
whom a corporation has moral obligations, and which corporate objectives are morally 
acceptable are central. It is in this understanding that the distinctions between two 
predominant models of corporate governance - the outsider-financed, Anglo-American, 
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shareholder and insider-financed, Continental European/Japanese stakeholder models3 - are 
most apparent, and it is in this context that ‘corporate governance’ is considered in this paper.   
Given that moral relativism remains a pressing issue in moral philosophy, and that corporate 
governance (at least in its broad sense) is a moral endeavour, an examination of how specific 
claims associated with moral relativism can be applied to corporate governance (and the 
degree to which they can be justified) is relevant. The purpose of this paper is to provide a 
detailed consideration of how the metaethical and normative claims of moral relativism4 can 
be applied to corporate governance. There has, to date, been no detailed consideration of how 
these two claims in particular could be applied to this issue. This paper thus contributes to 
this gap in the literature and extends the analysis of corporate governance and moral 
relativism provided by West (2009). The objective is achieved, firstly, through an 
investigation into the meaning of metaethical moral relativism, from which two specific 
questions are identified, both of which suggest a universalist morality that stands in 
opposition to metaethical moral relativism. The subsequent two sections then consider 
arguments and evidence that may support such universalist positions with regard to corporate 
governance and that would thereby counter the claim of metaethical moral relativism. This is 
followed by a consideration of an argument supporting metaethical moral relativism 
(referring to the work of Wong (1984, 1993, 2006)), and the extent to which this can be 
applied to corporate governance. The paper then turns to the claim of normative moral 
relativism and its applicability. The last section concludes the argument and discusses the 
implications for both theory and practice. 
THE MEANING OF METAETHICAL MORAL RELATIVISM 
The claim of metaethical moral relativism can be stated in a number of different ways, 
including: 
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“The truth or falsity of moral judgments, or their justification, is not absolute or 
universal, but is relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of a group of 
persons” (Gowans, 2012) 
“a denial that any single moral code has universal validity, and an assertion that moral 
truth and justifiability, if there are any such things, are in some way relative to factors 
that are culturally and historically contingent.” (Wong, 1993, p. 442) 
“Metaethical relativism states that moral judgments are not objectively true or false 
and thus that different individuals or societies can hold conflicting moral judgments 
without any of them being mistaken” (Moser and  Carson, 2001, p. 2) 
The descriptions provided are largely consistent with each other, with the exception that 
where Gowans and Wong refer to universal validity, Moser and Carson refer to objectivity. It 
may appear at first glance that moral universalism would be the position contrary to 
metaethical moral relativism. Holmes (2007) supports this, and describes moral universalism 
as a perspective in which “what is fundamentally right and wrong is the same for all people” 
(2007, p. 151), where any differences are considered to be due to at least one party being 
mistaken. However, Gowans (2012) notes that “metaethical moral relativist positions are 
typically contrasted with moral objectivism” (with moral objectivism typically holding that 
moral values are independent of individual ‘feeling-states’ and that moral judgements can be 
rationally justified and evaluated, see Hepburn (1995c)), but adds that such moral objectivism 
would hold that “moral judgments are ordinarily true or false in an absolute or universal 
sense”. 
One could thus position metaethical moral relativism as contrary to a universally valid, 
objectivist perspective of morality. However, this immediately suggests that there may also 
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be a non-objectivist but universally valid perspective which would also stand in opposition to 
metaethical moral relativism. Some consideration of moral subjectivism (as a non-objectivist 
perspective) is accordingly appropriate. 
Rachels (1993) provides a useful review of the merits of different versions of moral 
subjectivism. Beginning with what he refers to as a “simple subjectivism” (1993, p. 435), he 
describes it as “a theory which says that, in making moral judgements, people are doing 
nothing more than expressing their personal desires and feelings. On this view there are no 
moral ‘facts’” (1993, p. 432). He then dismisses this theory by referring to the observations 
that people are sometimes wrong in their moral judgements and that moral disagreements do 
sometimes occur. Neither of these observations is consistent with a simple subjectivist 
explanation of morality. Rachels then describes emotivism, as a stronger form of 
subjectivism, in which moral judgements do not just state an individual’s feelings (as in ‘I 
disapprove of theft’), but are best interpreted as quasi-imperatives (such as ‘I disapprove of 
theft. Do so as well’ (see Stevenson (1944, p. 22)) or as expressions of an attitude (such as 
‘Damn thievery!’). While emotivism avoids some of the problems of a simple subjectivism, it 
can also be considered inadequate as it does not account for the role of reasons that are 
implicit in moral judgements (a point also made by Williams (1972, p. 32), discussing 
subjectivism in general), and does not distinguish reasoning from rhetoric (Hepburn, 1995a)5.  
Rachels concludes by postulating a third version of subjectivism, suggested by the work of 
Dewey6 and Falk7. In this version, a distinction is drawn between moral judgements that are 
made before and those made after rational consideration of the relevant facts and arguments. 
The latter are then considered to provide the best basis for a subjectivist morality:  
“something is morally right if it is such that the process of thinking through its nature 
and consequences would cause or sustain a feeling of approval toward it in a person 
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who was being as reasonable and impartial as is humanly possible. This is just a 
convoluted way of saying that the morally right thing to do is whatever a completely 
reasonable person would approve.” (Rachels, 1993, p. 440)  
Along these lines, it is possible then to conceive of a universally valid, subjectivist 
perspective in which reasonable and impartial people agree on a particular morality. This 
provides an alternative position that also stands in opposition to metaethical moral relativism. 
The claim of metaethical moral relativism can be analysed with reference to these opposing 
positions by raising two questions. Firstly, is there an objective standpoint by which one 
morality can be shown to be superior to others? Secondly, is there a single morality on which 
all reasonable and impartial people agree? As metaethical moral relativism denies that either 
of these questions can be answered in the affirmative, evidence and arguments that support 
either of these would provide justification for denying the metaethical claim. If either claim 
could be shown to be true, then metaethical moral relativism would be false. 
These questions can be applied to the morality of corporate governance as follows: 
1. Is there a single, morally superior model of corporate governance?  
2. Is there evidence of agreement regarding the morality of corporate governance, 
amongst people being reasonable and impartial? 
The next two sections consider each of these questions in turn. 
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IS THERE A SINGLE, MORALLY SUPERIOR MODEL OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE? 
As noted above, a broad view of corporate governance includes the relationship between 
corporations and other groups within society, and moral aspects thereof.  Questions that arise 
include: what moral obligations do corporations have to various groups, and which corporate 
objectives are morally justifiable? Although there are differences regarding exactly how each 
of the two broad models of corporate governance (the outsider-financed, Anglo-American, 
shareholder and the insider-financed, Continental European/Japanese stakeholder) are 
implemented around the world, these broad distinctions reflect substantively different 
answers to this questions8. Furthermore, their supporters have provided particular moral 
justifications for these answers.  
Accordingly, in answering the questions related to metaethical moral relativism raised in the 
previous section, it is appropriate to examine the arguments put forward to support the 
shareholder and stakeholder perspectives of corporate governance. Although it is not 
possible, within the confines of this paper, to examine all arguments in favour of either of 
these models, it is possible to examine several of the most prominent arguments that have 
been put forward to support the view that either the shareholder or the stakeholder model is 
superior, on moral grounds. For the purposes of this paper, the shareholder model is 
represented by the work of Milton Friedman (1970) and by Hansmann and Kraakman (2001). 
Friedman’s article is chosen as it was instrumental in furthering the view that shareholder 
primacy is the only ‘correct’, ‘true’ or morally appropriate orientation, has become 
“canonical” within the literature (Freeman et al., 2010, p. 202) and, although published over 
forty years ago, is still the subject of recent research (see, for example, Cosans (2009) and M. 
S. Schwartz and Saiia (2012)).  Although a considerable literature regarding the Anglo-
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American, shareholder perspective has developed, much of the research (such as Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and Fama (1980)) is positivist rather than normative, and accordingly does 
not actually provide justifications for the superiority of the model. Hansmann and 
Kraakman’s article was chosen as it does provide a systematic case for the superiority of 
Anglo-American shareholder-oriented corporate governance. 
The stakeholder model is represented by the work of R. Edward Freeman, who since 1984 
has contributed significantly to widespread consideration of stakeholder interests amongst 
academics and in practice. Phillips et al. (2003) identified several normative justifications for 
stakeholder theory, including Kantian deontology, Feminist ethics, principles of fairness 
(including that of Rawls), implicit social contracts, property rights, risk and the concept of the 
common good. While there may be a number of different justifications for considering the 
interests of a variety of stakeholders (and Freeman (1994) in fact calls for a plurality of 
‘normative cores’), perhaps the most prominent of these have been those that have drawn on 
Kantian ethics and principles of fairness, and that are largely deontological (see also Gibson 
(2000)). Accordingly, the examination of arguments in favour of the stakeholder perspective 
focuses on two articles, those by Evan and Freeman (1988) and by Freeman (1994). The 
former represents a foundational normative justification, based on Kantian deontological 
ethics, for stakeholder theory (playing a similar role to Friedman’s (1970) article for 
shareholder theory). The latter article was written in order to “clarify certain foundational 
issues” regarding stakeholder theory and, in this sense, provided an ‘update’ to the theory, 
specifically considering its normative justifications9. 
The remainder of this section will focus on these normative justifications that have been 
provided for the shareholder and stakeholder models of corporate governance. In each 
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subsection the central arguments for the moral superiority of each model are presented (in 
some cases the morality is more implicit than in others) and briefly evaluated. 
The Friedman ‘Doctrine’ 
Milton Friedman, reflecting the traditional Anglo-American approach to corporate 
governance articulated by Berle (1931) and Berle and Means (1932), espoused the view that 
businesses should focus exclusively on economic matters (increasing profits). A number of 
specific arguments can be identified in his (1970) article The social responsibility of business 
is to increase its profits, which are either explicitly or implicitly moral. 
Firstly, Friedman asserts that as corporate executives are agents of their employers (the 
owners, or shareholders, of the company), spending on social responsibilities (that does not 
maximise profits) is acting contrary to the interests of one’s employers. Secondly, when 
spending on social responsibilities, executives are effectively spending someone else’s 
money (shareholders, customers or employees, depending on whom is most affected). This is 
equivalent to imposing and spending a tax, which is a public function. Political processes 
have been devised to provide adequate safeguards regarding taxation, and consequently it is 
inappropriate for corporate executives to be acting as civil servants and bypassing these 
safeguards. Thirdly, executives are not experts at making non-commercial decisions. 
Allowing or requiring executives to make decisions concerning social concerns will 
inevitably result in poor and/or unintended consequences. 
Friedman ultimately considers the call for social responsibilities to undermine the essence of 
the free market, private enterprise and capitalism, and advocating social responsibilities is 
identified with the exploitation of others. The morality of the shareholder orientation is thus 
considered to be superior:  
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“The difficulty of exercising ‘social responsibility’ illustrates, of course, the great 
virtue of private competitive enterprise – it forces people to be responsible for their 
own actions and makes it difficult for them to ‘exploit’ other people for either selfish 
or unselfish purposes. They can do good, but only at their own expense” (Friedman, 
1970, p. 123).  
Weaknesses in Friedman’s argument and defence of a shareholder orientation have been 
pointed out by a number of scholars. Some (such as Boatright (1994)) have questioned the 
actual status of shareholders as owners, the validity of the principal-agent view, and the 
parties to whom directors actually have fiduciary duties, while others (such as Freeman et al. 
(2004)) observe that executives already engage with stakeholders to ensure the best outcome 
for the corporation. Phillips et al. (2003) also note that the shareholder model has not been 
particularly effective in preventing financial scandals such as Enron and WorldCom, 
questioning whether the shareholder model does indeed make exploitation and ‘managerial 
opportunism’ difficult.  
Friedman’s description of the responsibilities of executives is also notable:  
“to conduct the business in accordance with their [shareholders’] desires, which 
generally will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic 
rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical 
custom” (1970, p. 33)  
Although often read as advocating a single-minded pursuit of profit, this also allows both for 
shareholders who may not always have profit-making as their only objective and for ‘ethical 
custom’ that presumably may vary from place to place and that could consequently place 
differing demands on corporate executives. The possibility of such ‘ethical custom’ including 
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the consideration of various other stakeholders as ends in themselves is not considered by 
Friedman. 
Friedman’s arguments that engaging in social responsibilities is immoral have been, to a 
significant extent, countered by stakeholder theorists. Furthermore, he does not address (and 
would seem to allow) the possibility of differing ethical customs regarding the relationship 
between a corporation and its stakeholders. This version of shareholder theory cannot itself 
be considered to clearly present a single morally superior model of corporate governance. 
The End of History for Corporate Law 
Where Friedman drew attention to the alleged immorality of social responsibility, a more 
definitive claim for the superiority of the shareholder model has been made by Hansmann and 
Kraakman (2001). They pronounced “The end of history for corporate law”, arguing that the 
Anglo-American shareholder model has proved to be superior to its alternatives, and provide 
a number of reasons to support their view. 
Firstly, Hansmann and Kraakman characterise three alternatives to the shareholder model that 
were implemented in the twentieth century as the manager-oriented, labour-oriented and 
state-oriented models (they acknowledge stakeholder models, but consider these to be 
variants of the manager-oriented or labour-oriented model). In their view, all of these have 
failed, leaving the shareholder model as the only viable alternative. They continue by 
providing reasons for the superiority of the shareholder model, believing that “important 
economic forces have made the virtues of that model increasingly salient” (2001, p. 449). In 
their view the shareholder model’s superiority can be demonstrated by logic, through 
example, and by referring to the forces of competition. Each of these is considered in turn. 
Appeal to logic 
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Hansmann and Kraakman’s appeal to logic takes the form of an assertion that the shareholder 
model “offers greater efficiencies than the principal alternatives” (2001, p. 449). Four reasons 
are provided to support this assertion. The first is the observation that equity investors cannot 
be protected by contract, and therefore require the right of control in order to protect their 
interests.  The second reason is an appeal to the observation that when shareholders have 
strong and exclusive rights, they will have “powerful incentives” (2001, p. 449) to maximize 
the value of the business. The third reason points to the fact that other stakeholders can be 
protected through contract and regulation, which in turn means that the shareholders’ position 
of value maximisation complements rather than competes with stakeholder interests. The last 
reason is that even if such contract and regulation is ineffective, changing corporate 
governance is considered to create “more difficulties than it solves” (2001, p. 449). 
The first reason appeals to a sense of fairness or justice, as without the right of control, 
shareholders would be unfairly prejudiced relative to other stakeholders. This has been 
questioned by Freeman and Evan (1990), however, who use a transaction cost approach to 
argue that “owners seem to have the least claim to voting membership, as a result of the 
existence of the market for shares” (1990, p. 344) and that “other stakeholders have at least as 
good a claim as owners” (1990, p. 344).  
The second, third and fourth reasons above can all be considered to be utilitarian in that they 
assert that the shareholder model will generate the greatest good for the greatest number, and 
that attempts to significantly alter the principal aspects of shareholder primacy will have 
negative (or less positive) consequences. The second reason depends on shareholders actually 
having a strong incentive to maximise the value of the business. Although it seems clear that 
shareholders will all have some incentive to maximise the value of the business, the nature 
and extent of this can be questioned with reference to speculative shareholders that are more 
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interested in short-term gains than long-term value, and those shareholders that prefer to 
invest in ‘socially responsible’ companies or investment funds, despite the possibility of 
lower returns. In addition, the last reason would be disputed by advocates of stakeholder 
models, who would simply claim that the difficulties of changing governance structures 
would be outweighed by the (moral, and possibly unquantifiable) benefits.  
Hansmann and Kraakman’s argument from logic is thus not as self-evident as they suggest. 
The preferential claim of shareholders to rights of control can be disputed, and without 
further evidence concerning the incentives of shareholders and the consequences of altering 
governance structures, their argument suggests that the shareholder model may be superior, 
but is not sufficient to show that it is superior. Furthermore, in a subsequent section, 
Hansmann and Kraakman note that “firms operating under the standard [shareholder] model 
may be no more efficient than other firms in many respects” (2001, p. 451) and specifically 
identify several efficient businesses operating within stakeholder jurisdictions. This would 
seem to contradict their first assertion above. 
Appeal by example 
Hansmann and Kraakman’s appeal by example claims that the shareholder model is superior 
as the American economy (as a shareholder-oriented jurisdiction) has outperformed the 
German, Japanese and French economies (all of which maintain variants of stakeholder 
models). They discard arguments that emphasise the growth periods of Germany and Japan 
by arguing that the shareholder orientation has only really been practiced from the late 1980s 
(considering American companies prior to this to have been manager-oriented).  
This appeal can be confirmed and extended by reviewing the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
growth figures for selected countries (available from The World Bank (2013)). A comparison 
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of France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the USA for the period 1990 to 2011 shows 
that for 15 of the 22 years, either the UK or the USA had higher GDP growth rates than any 
of the other countries. For 10 of these years, both the USA and UK had higher GDP growth 
rates than all of the other countries. This provides some support for Hansmann and 
Kraakman’s assertion that economies that maintain a shareholder-oriented model have 
outperformed those with a stakeholder-oriented model. It is worthwhile noting, however, that 
in the period since Hansmann and Kraakman’s (2001) paper, the growth rates of the different 
countries have been closer than in the preceding decade, virtually converged in 2007, and that 
there is no discernible difference between the UK/US and the other countries from 2006 to 
2011. This could conceivably be due to increasing convergence of models, or it may indicate 
that the superiority of the Anglo-American model is not as great as Hansmann and Kraakman 
claim. Either of these interpretations raises significant questions about the plausibility of the 
appeal by example, and further evidence is required. Furthermore, the utilitarian ethic that 
underlies this argument can be subjected to criticism (Jones and Felps (2013) point out 
weaknesses in the argument implicit in utilitarian shareholder-oriented approaches) and there 
may be measures of utility other than GDP (or any other economic measure), that constitute 
the ‘good’, ‘happiness’ or ‘well-being’ (see, for example, McDonnell (2002) and J. S. 
Harrison and Wicks (2013)). 
Appeal by force of competition 
Globalisation has brought companies from different jurisdictions into competition, and 
Hansmann and Kraakman claim that “it is now widely thought that firms organized and 
operated according to the shareholder-oriented model have had the upper hand in these more 
direct encounters as well” (2001, p. 450). They refer to a survey in which American and 
British companies are well represented amongst ‘the world’s most respected companies’, and 
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to advantages that shareholder-oriented companies have, including cheaper capital, “more 
aggressive development of new product markets, stronger incentives to reorganize along lines 
that are managerially coherent, and more rapid abandonment of inefficient investments” 
(2001, p. 451), citing research in central Europe to support the claim regarding new product 
markets. They also argue that in growth industries, shareholder-oriented companies will be 
more successful as they have greater access to capital through institutional investors and 
international equity markets, and believe that other models will be confined to “older firms 
and mature product markets” (2001, p. 451). 
They admit, however, that shareholder-oriented companies will not necessarily replace 
others, for two reasons. Firstly, and as noted above, they identify several efficient companies 
in stakeholder jurisdictions (Japan, Korea, the Netherlands and Germany) and believe that 
shareholder-oriented businesses “may be no more efficient than other firms in many respects” 
(2001, p. 451). Secondly, the other (stakeholder-oriented) businesses may be able to dominate 
markets through underpricing or overinvesting. Nonetheless, they believe that the competitive 
advantages that shareholder-oriented companies have (noted above) will lead to their 
eventual predominance.  
Cheaper capital and access to capital markets may well confer particular competitive 
advantages, particularly in growth industries and for new products. Hansmann and Kraakman 
may then be successful at showing how shareholder-oriented businesses could predominate 
over time. Having mechanisms by which a model is likely to be more widely adopted does 
not, however, equate to moral superiority. To some extent, the analysis also ignores 
successful American corporations that have adopted a stakeholder orientation. Phillips et al. 
(2003, p. 498) draw attention to some of the American ‘visionary companies’ identified by 
Collins and Porras (1994) and the fact that the authors (Collins and Porras) did not refer to 
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profit ‘maximisation’ (preferring instead ‘reasonable’, ‘fair’, ‘adequate’ and ‘attractive’ 
profits). This suggests that the eventual predominance of the Anglo-American model may not 
be solely attributable to corporations that maintain a shareholder perspective. 
In summary, as an argument for moral superiority Hansmann and Kraakman’s approach is 
limited to a very specific, debatable, interpretation of the moral good - a utilitarian appeal 
based on the relative economic performance of certain countries.   
 
The Stakeholder Theory of Freeman et al. 
Phillips et al. (2003) clarify the distinguishing characteristic of stakeholder theory, stating 
that,  
“attention to the interests and well-being of some non-shareholders is obligatory for 
more than prudential and instrumental purposes of wealth maximization of equity 
shareholders. While there are still some stakeholder groups whose relationship with 
the organization remains instrumental (due largely to the power they yield) there are 
other normatively legitimate stakeholders than simply equity shareholders alone.” 
(2003, p. 481) 
In developing their stakeholder view, Evan and Freeman (1988, p. 100) point out that 
“property rights are not absolute, especially when they conflict with important rights of 
others” and that, 
“each person has the right to be treated, not as a means to some corporate end, but as 
an end in itself. If the modern corporation insists in treating others as means to an end, 
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then at minimum they must agree to and hence participate (or choose not to 
participate) in the decisions to be used as such.” (1988, p. 100) 
Evan and Freeman maintain two basic principles that underlie their theory. Firstly, that the 
“legitimate rights of others” (1988, p. 100) should not be violated, and secondly, that “the 
corporation and its managers are responsible for the effects of their actions on others” (1988, 
p. 100). Considering the first of these, however, Maitland (1989, 1994) argues that the 
various stakeholders negotiate their own terms as part of the contracting processes and within 
a free market. In this view stakeholder rights are not being violated, and “the corporation ... 
already reflects the interest of all the parties to it, or they would not have contracted with it in 
the first place” (1994, p. 450). He also argues that setting up moral rights for employees 
would actually “invade a worker’s right to freely choose the terms and conditions that he (or 
she) judges are the best for him” (1989, p. 954). 
Evan and Freeman then address the basic questions of the purpose of the corporation, and to 
whom directors have responsibilities by providing two principles to be used to further 
develop the theory: 
“P1: The corporation should be managed for the benefit of its stakeholders ... The 
rights of these groups must be ensured, and, further, the groups must participate, in 
some sense, in decisions that substantially affect their welfare. 
P2: Management bears a fiduciary relationship to stakeholders and to the corporation 
as an abstract entity. It must act in the interests of the stakeholders as their agent, and 
it must act in the interests of the corporation to ensure the survival of the firm, 
safeguarding the long-term stakes of each group.” (1988, p. 103) 
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To avoid difficulties with extensive stakeholder lists that could be drawn up based on these 
two principles, Evan and Freeman focus on a narrower definition of stakeholders as groups 
that “are vital to the survival and success of the corporation” (1988, p. 100) and include 
managers, employees, customers, suppliers, owners and the local community. They go on to 
expand on the stakes of the various stakeholders, and how they are vital to the corporation’s 
success.  
Evan and Freeman (1988) did refer to Rawls’s theory of justice in passing, and in another 
article, (Freeman and  Evan, 1990) further developed their basic principles by drawing on 
Rawlsian principles of justice and fairness (and referring to the ‘veil of ignorance’) to justify 
a stakeholder view of the corporation and to argue for stakeholder voting rights. In his 1994 
article Freeman called for a pluralism of stakeholder theories with different ‘normative 
cores’, and then proceeded to argue for a stakeholder theory which has pragmatic liberalism 
and the notions of fairness, autonomy and solidarity (referring to the work of Rawls and 
Rorty) as its ‘normative core’: 
“The normative core for this redesigned contractual theory will capture the liberal 
idea of fairness if it ensures a basic equality among stakeholders in terms of their 
moral rights as these are realized in the firm, and if it recognises that inequalities 
among stakeholders are justified if they raise the level of the least well-off 
stakeholder. The liberal idea of autonomy is captured by the realization that each 
stakeholder must be free to enter agreements that create value for themselves, and 
solidarity is realized by the recognition of the mutuality of stakeholder interests.” 
(1994, p. 415) 
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Freeman (1994) then goes on to outline a ‘Doctrine of Fair Contracts’ comprised of six 
principles derived from hypothesising a Rawlsian ‘veil of ignorance’, and ultimately suggests 
changes to corporate law. 
The arguments for stakeholder theory presented above are based on the deontological ethical 
theories of either Kant or Rawls. The Kantian justification can be challenged by pointing out 
that Kant’s categorical imperative required that people are not treated merely as a means to an 
end: “For all rational beings come under the law that each of them must treat itself and all 
others never merely as a means, but in every case at the same time as ends in themselves” 
(Kant, 1947, orig. 1785). In the Anglo-American, shareholder-oriented model of corporate 
governance, voluntary contracting and efficient markets are essential. In such a model 
stakeholders such as employees, customers and suppliers have the freedom and autonomy to 
negotiate their terms and the parties with whom they choose to contract. They are 
consequently not treated ‘merely’ as a means to an end, but are simultaneously considered 
ends in themselves, and such a model of corporate governance can thus be considered to 
satisfy Kant’s imperative. (As noted above, Maitland (1989) takes this further, arguing that 
the stakeholder model actually impinges upon the freedom of various parties to engage in 
voluntary contracting.) 
Rawls’ principles can be contrasted with Nozick’s (1974) entitlement theory of justice, in 
which a distribution of resources is just if certain procedural requirements regarding how 
resources can be acquired and transferred are met. In Nozick’s view, an unequal distribution 
is not relevant, and thus not necessarily unjust. Coelho et al. (2003b) also point out that 
applying Rawls’s principles to corporate governance would result in the least advantaged 
parties being favoured, and they question which stakeholder groups (including executive 
management) would be considered advantaged or disadvantaged.  
23 
 
 
Furthermore, a number of criticisms are commonly levelled by shareholder theorists. These 
include criticisms that stakeholder theory is ambiguous and that it allows for managerial 
abuse. These criticisms are taken up and largely rebutted by Phillips et al. (2003). In arguing 
that stakeholder theory does not mean that all stakeholders are treated equally, however, they 
suggest that stakeholder theory can be defended as a meritocracy, and quote the Sloan 
Colloquy (that promoted stakeholder research), stating that “Corporations should attempt to 
distribute the benefits of their activities as equitably as possible among stakeholders, in light 
of their respective contributions, costs and risks” (Phillips et al., 2003, p. 488). The 
shareholder model, with the process of voluntary contracting within a free market, could, 
however, be the approach that best achieves this distributive goal.  
It is not possible here to adequately detail the various other normative justifications for 
stakeholder theory that have been put forward. Yet it is notable that in Freeman’s (1994) 
article he rejects the idea of a stakeholder theory based on a single, rationally superior 
normative justification, and calls instead for a ‘reasonable pluralism’ in which stakeholder 
theory is comprised of a “genre of stories about how we could live” (1994, p. 413). Freeman 
still rejects shareholder theory, but such a pluralistic approach suggests that no single 
normative justification for stakeholder theory is regarded as definitively superior, on moral 
grounds.  
Reviewing these specific arguments provided by both shareholder and stakeholder theorists, 
and considering how they have been criticised, addressed and can be countered, it appears 
that none are yet sufficient in supporting the assertion that there is a single, morally superior 
model of corporate governance. 
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EVIDENCE OF REASONABLE AND IMPARTIAL AGREEMENT 
Although the evidence and arguments discussed above do not adequately support the claim 
that a particular model of corporate governance is morally superior, it may be possible to 
identify areas of significant agreement, or a trend towards agreement on which corporate 
governance model is morally appropriate. As discussed above, evidence of significant 
agreement would support a universally valid, subjectivist perspective that is in opposition to 
the metaethical moral relativist claim. 
While the shareholder model can be traced back to the work of Adam Smith (1776), Post 
(2003a) identifies the beginnings of stakeholder theory with the “expanded view of social 
responsibility” (2003a, p. 31) advocated by Merrick Dodd in 1932. According to Sundarum 
and Inkpen (2004a), Dodd and Adolf Berle debated the issue until 1954. This debate was 
reflected in legislative changes in the USA, and Sundarum and Inkpen note that by the 1970s 
“the three-decade burst of pro-shareholder sentiment during the early part of the twentieth 
century had been replaced by four decades of pro-stakeholder sentiment” (2004a, p. 351), and 
that the last two decades were then pro-shareholder. Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) 
similarly refer to a ‘manager-oriented’ view that existed from the 1930s to the 1960s, that 
saw managers as “disinterested technocratic fiduciaries who would guide business 
corporations to perform in ways that would serve the general public interest” (2001, p. 444). 
They refer to a corporate social responsibility literature existing from the 1950s. Milton 
Friedman’s (1970) article was clearly written in response to growing calls for social 
responsibility, and this was followed by the development of shareholder-oriented agency 
theory. The growth of stakeholder theory from the 1980s, however, called for stakeholder 
engagement to become a greater part of the managerial role. Over the last century there does 
not appear to be any clear trend towards either model. 
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This lack of agreement is illustrated by comments in the more recent literature on shareholder 
and stakeholder theories, which reflect the authors’ commitments to their own (differing) 
perspectives: 
“The stakeholder theory is so void of intellectually consistent content that it provides 
a refuge for knaves and/or fools.” (Coelho et al., 2003b, p. 54) 
“In the field of finance, the logic of shareholder value maximization is accepted as 
being so obvious that textbooks just assert it, rather than argue for it.” (Sundarum and  
Inkpen, 2004a, p. 350) 
“I believe we can safely say that the stockholder theory is or at least should be 
intellectually dead.” (Freeman, 1994, p. 413) 
Similarly, Hansmann and Kraakman’s (2001) article is notable for claiming that the 
consensus has already been reached, and in its continued reference to the shareholder model 
as the ‘standard’ model. 
Despite these somewhat categorical statements, the literature includes examples of reasonable 
debate. The Spring and Fall 2003 editions of the Mid-American Journal of Business include 
exchanges between Coelho et al. (2003a, 2003b) (supporting the shareholder model) and Post 
(2003a, 2003b) (a stakeholder theorist). In 2004, a similar exchange, between Sundarum and 
Inkpen (2004a, 2004b) (shareholder model) and Freeman et al. (2004) (as stakeholder 
theorists) was published in Organization Science. Although these examples of academic 
debate could result in reasonable and impartial agreement, their contribution lies rather in 
providing useful articulations of the two models of corporate governance; neither of the 
exchanges resulted in agreement on which model is best. 
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Despite the continuing rival positions, there are some areas where agreement does appear to 
be present. The second article by Sundarum and Inkpen referred to above is notable for 
indicating how shareholder theorists do not necessarily imitate Friedman’s (1970) position. 
Their claim that corporations should be involved in creating the greatest value for all 
stakeholders would seem to be something that stakeholder theorists would agree with. 
Phillips et al. (2003) also note that there is no conflict around the objective of ‘value 
maximization’, the conflict is over how this is distributed, and who gets a say in decision-
making.  
Furthermore, and as noted earlier, Maitland (1989, 1994) argues that the free market and 
voluntary contracting allows for different groups to choose their positions, and to trade-off 
whichever rights they choose monetarily (such as by employees accepting a position with 
fewer employee rights, but higher wages). He argues (1994) that there is therefore no 
fundamental moral disagreement, as both stakeholder and shareholder theorists agree that all 
stakeholders have rights that should be respected by the corporation. In his view, the 
difference is empirical, in that shareholder theorists believe that these rights are already 
respected through the operation of the free market and voluntary contracting, whereas 
stakeholder theorists consider these mechanisms to be ineffective in protecting stakeholder 
rights. As an empirical disagreement, improved empirical knowledge would be able to 
resolve the disagreement. However, it seems likely that even with perfect empirical 
knowledge, different parties would disagree on whether the free market and voluntary 
contracting adequately protect stakeholder rights, precisely because they maintain different 
conceptions of the value and/or priority of such rights. 
There may therefore be some agreement, particularly regarding value maximisation as a 
moral objective and in the belief that all stakeholders have some rights. However, 
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disagreement continues concerning how value is to be maximised, and different moral 
judgements regarding the value and/or priority of different stakeholder groups remain; these 
different perspectives are encapsulated and embodied by different models of corporate 
governance. Accordingly, there is, as yet, insufficient evidence of agreement to justify a 
single universally valid, subjectivist perspective regarding corporate governance. 
 AN ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF METAETHICAL MORAL RELATIVISM 
The preceding two sections considered the arguments and evidence that could be used to 
support a universalist perspective. Insufficient evidence for moral universalism does not, 
however, necessarily mean that metaethical moral relativism is true. Consequently it is 
worthwhile considering arguments in favour of metaethical moral relativism. 
Metaethical moral relativism is sometimes associated with moral disagreement and diversity, 
and the existence of such disagreement and diversity is sometimes taken to provide evidence 
that morality is relative and that there is no universal morality (the ‘anthropological’ 
argument). However, the existence of moral disagreement (the claim of descriptive moral 
relativism, see Gowans (2012)10 and Brandt (1967)) does not necessarily mean that 
metaethical moral relativism is true. It is quite possible that individuals or groups disagree on 
certain issues, with some (or one) of these individuals or groups being actually correct or 
true, and the others being mistaken, or with neither party being correct or true. 
Metaethical moral relativism could also be associated with other perspectives on morality, 
such as moral subjectivism, moral irrealism and moral non-cognitivism. Problems with 
subjectivism have been mentioned above, and such a perspective does not itself seem to 
provide support for metaethical moral relativism. The views of moral irrealism and moral 
non-cognitivism are themselves similar in that where the former holds that there are no moral 
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facts, and that moral judgements cannot be true or false, the latter adds to this the view that 
the truth-value of moral judgements cannot be known (see Hepburn (1995b) and R. Harrison 
(1995b) for definitions of moral realism and non-cognitivism respectively). M. Smith 
summarises an irrealist, non-cognitivist view as holding that “moral judgements simply 
express our desires about how people behave” (M. Smith, 1993, p. 403). Like desires, moral 
judgements could then vary from person to person, without different people being mistaken. 
However, this suffers from the same sort of criticism as moral subjectivism, and, like Rachels 
(1993), Smith (1993, p. 403) argues that the view that moral judgements are no more than 
desires does not adequately account for the existence of moral argument and reflection.  
Arguments for moral relativism that are based on the existence of moral difference, or that 
appeal to moral subjectivism, irrealism or non-cognitivism are accordingly problematic. 
However, a more nuanced defence of moral relativism is provided in the work of David 
Wong (1984). He begins by presenting six claims regarding the objectivity or subjectivity of 
morality: 
1. Moral statements have truth values; 
2. There are good and bad arguments for the moral positions people take; 
3. Nonmoral facts ... are relevant to the assessment of the truth value of moral 
statements 
4. There are moral facts (that may or may not be claimed to be reducible in some 
way to nonmoral facts); 
5. When two moral statements conflict as recommendations to action, only one 
statement can be true; 
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6. There is a single true morality. (1984, p. 1) 
He argues that accepting claims 1 to 4, while denying claims 5 and 6, reconciles objective 
and subjective aspects of morality, and provides a better explanation of moral differences and 
disagreement than the explanations provided by non-relativists. He proceeds by (1) 
identifying morality as the ‘ought’ statements or rules that regulate conflict between people 
and within individuals, (2) eliminating non-relativist explanations of moral difference and 
disagreement as being implausible and unconvincing, and (3) asserting that a relativist 
analysis that permits morality to vary across different groups (but that still addresses the basic 
function of morality) provides a better explanation of moral difference and disagreement. 
Wong (1984, p. 175) provides a summary of his argument as follows: 
“Human beings have needs to resolve internal conflicts between requirements and to 
resolve interpersonal conflicts of interest. Morality is a social creation that evolved in 
response to these needs. There are constraints on what a morality could be like and 
still serve those needs. These constraints are derived from the physical environment, 
from human nature, and from standards of rationality, but they are not enough to 
eliminate all but one morality as meeting those needs. Moral relativity is an indication 
of the plasticity of human nature, of the power of ways of life to determine what 
constitutes a satisfactory resolution of the conflicts morality is intended to resolve.” 
This argument is a limited version of moral relativism as Wong asserts the truth of the first 
four claims above, and depends on a non-relative view of the basic function of morality. He 
expands on this basic function of morality, stating that: 
“adequate moralities must promote the production of persons capable of considering 
the interests of others. Such persons would need to have received a certain kind of 
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nurturing and care from others. An adequate morality, then, whatever else its content, 
would have to prescribe and promote the sorts of upbringing and continuing 
interpersonal relationships that produce such persons.” (1993, p. 446) 
And in a later work identifies five specific constraints on what could constitute an adequate 
morality: 
“requiring human beings to seek only that which they have some propensity to seek; 
inclusion of norms of reciprocity in light of strong self-interest; in specification of 
norms and reasons, balancing self- and other-concern in ways that include putting less 
pressure on other-concern through provision of some ‘payoff’ in terms of self-interest; 
justifiability of norms and reasons to the governed in terms of their interests when 
presented without falsification; and finally the value of accommodation of moral 
disagreement.” (2006, p. 65) 
Wong makes use of a number of examples of different moralities to demonstrate his relativist 
perspective. These include the difference between virtue-centred and rights-centred 
moralities, different concepts of distributive justice (he refers specifically to the work of 
Rawls and Nozick) and differences within virtue-centred moralities (referring to Classical 
Greek and Confucian moralities). He argues that all of these moralities achieve the basic 
function of morality, that the non-relativist explanations are unsatisfactory and inadequate in 
explaining the continued moral disagreement, and that a relativist position provides a better 
explanation of the moral differences. (His emphasis on the unsatisfactory nature of non-
relativist explanations of difference thus extends the anthropological argument for 
relativism.)  
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The strength of Wong’s defence lies in how it does not necessarily require a subjectivist or 
irrealist conception of morality. By allowing for the possibility of there being moral facts and 
truth values (points 1 to 4 above), Wong’s approach avoids the criticism that faces any 
relativism that is based on a subjectivist view of morality (i.e. that is does not adequately 
account for the existence of moral disagreement and moral progress). For example, where 
Rachels (1999) criticised cultural relativism by pointing out three intuitively undesirable 
consequences: that we could not criticise other moralities (even if they support practices of 
which we do not approve, such as slavery), right and wrong would be determined purely by 
our own society’s standards, and the very idea of moral progress would be questionable, 
Wong’s (limited) moral relativism avoids these criticisms. By providing certain necessary 
(universal) requirements for an adequate morality and admitting the possibility of moral facts 
and truth values, all of these consequences can be avoided. This does, however, leave Wong 
open to the criticism that his is not a relativist approach at all – yet, given the problematic 
nature of a more wide-ranging moral relativism that is based on a subjectivist, irrealist 
perspective, this criticism (and the limited version of moral relativism) may be worth 
accepting.  
According to Gowans (2012) the other leading defender of moral relativism is Gilbert 
Harman. He provided an account (2001, orig. 1984) of moral relativism that specifically 
emphasises how the difference between relativist and non-relativist approaches largely 
corresponds to an underlying irreconcilable difference between ‘naturalistic’ and 
‘autonomous’ approaches to morality. Harman favours a ‘naturalistic’ approach in which he 
considers morality to be reducible entirely to psychological and/or sociological factors, but 
also acknowledges that this approach is open to similar criticism to that facing a materialist 
approach to the problem of consciousness (i.e. that neither explanation adequately accounts 
for our experience of morality / consciousness). He concludes by stating that “I see no 
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knockdown argument for either side. A question of judgment is involved…” (Harman, 2001, 
orig. 1984, p. 183). Again, by allowing for the possible existence of moral facts (that might 
not be reducible to nonmoral explanations) and truth values, Wong’s approach avoids this 
criticism. 
The implications that Wong’s approach has for the morality of corporate governance can be 
considered as follows. Firstly, both the shareholder and stakeholder models can claim to 
achieve the function of regulating interpersonal conflict, and comply with the requirements of 
adequate moralities, albeit in different ways. Where the shareholder model relies largely on 
voluntary contracting and the free market, the stakeholder model prefers a more active 
engagement with the different parties affected by a corporation. Secondly, in terms of 
explaining the persistent disagreement, non-relativists would insist that one party is mistaken 
or ignorant in some way. This is indeed what the different theorists referred to above have 
done. However, the debate is far from settled and neither party’s arguments are conclusive. 
Furthermore, the areas of agreement across the shareholder and stakeholder models are 
limited, and the models reflect more fundamental differences in the relative value and/or 
priority of different stakeholder groups. These differences are similar to, and appear to be as 
incommensurable as some of the moral differences that Wong uses as examples (such as the 
difference between Rawls and Nozick’s concepts of justice). In this regard, Wong’s approach 
does provide a framework that supports the claim that there is no single true corporate 
governance morality. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR NORMATIVE MORAL RELATIVISM 
The discussion above, focused on the claim of metaethical moral relativism, suggests (1) that 
the debate around models of corporate governance has not yet convincingly argued that a 
single model of corporate governance is morally superior, or that there is universal agreement 
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towards one particular model, and (2) that a case can be made for metaethical moral 
relativism being plausible with regards to models of corporate governance. The claim of 
normative moral relativism can be formulated such that “we should not interfere with the 
actions of persons that are based on moral judgments we reject, when the disagreement is not 
or cannot be rationally resolved” (Gowans (2012), see also Moser and Carson (2001) and 
Brandt (1967)). Accepting the claims of descriptive and metaethical moral relativism does 
not logically require that this normative claim be accepted. As neither of the descriptive or 
metaethical claims actually provides any prescription of how one ought to behave, simply 
deriving such a normative prescription from these is problematic. The addition of a normative 
premise that could be justified would, however, overcome this difficulty. In this respect, 
Wong’s work on moral relativism is again relevant as he provides such an additional premise, 
in earlier (1984) work, in a value of tolerance, and in his more recent (2006) work, in a value 
of accommodation. This section considers each of these in turn. 
A Value of Tolerance 
Wong’s value of tolerance is expressed in his ‘justification principle’. Referring to Kantian 
deontological morality, he expresses this as the principle that “one should not interfere with 
the ends of others unless one can justify the interference to be acceptable to them were they 
fully rational and informed in all relevant circumstances” (Wong, 1984, p. 181). He also 
argues that the justification principle can be derived with reference to Mill’s utilitarianism, 
where individual autonomy is a necessary condition for achieving individual well-being, and 
consequently that “when an individual’s freedom is restricted in such a way that it cannot be 
justified to him or her, the kind of growth that Mill thought to be essential to well-being is 
frustrated” (1984, p. 184). This requirement of non-interference amounts to a value of 
tolerance when two individuals (or groups) express their different and conflicting moralities. 
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Wong notes (1984, p. 182), however, that the strength of the value of tolerance is dependent 
upon whether this justification principle is maintained within the morality of a certain 
individual or group. Although he shows how it can be derived with reference to Kant’s or 
Mill’s moral philosophies, it may not be consistent with other moral philosophies. 
Furthermore, Wong adds (1984, p. 182) that even where such a value of tolerance is 
maintained, it must still be weighed up against other moral principles that may place 
conflicting demands (such as a principle to prevent harm to others). The other principles may 
outweigh the justification principle and the value of tolerance. In some situations it may be 
possible to compromise and observe the conflicting duties partially (1984, p. 183). These 
additional considerations introduce an element of subjectivity to the question of when and 
where the value of tolerance applies. 
A Value of Accommodation 
More recently, Wong (2006) investigated in more detail the requirements, or constraints, on 
what could constitute an adequate morality. As noted above, he specified five such 
constraints, including “the value of accommodation of moral disagreement” (2006, p. 65). 
Wong explains that the value of accommodation commits one “to supporting noncoercive and 
constructive relations with others although they have ethical beliefs that conflict with one’s 
own” (2006, p. 64). He bases the necessity of such a value upon the observation that there are 
serious moral disagreements both within and across societies and that without such 
accommodation to ensure the “stability and integrity of these traditions and societies” (2006, 
p. 64), repression would result. In addition to insisting upon accommodation as a necessary 
constraint for any adequate morality, Wong (2006, p. 251) provides two additional, although 
less compelling, reasons in support of the value. Firstly, he argues that noncoercive and 
constructive relationships are desirable ends in themselves - that accommodation reflects a 
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respect for others that is characteristic of moral maturity. Secondly, he considers that 
accommodating others’ differences may be instrumental in achieving cooperation in those 
areas that are shared.  
Wong (2006, p. 252) suggests that the value of accommodation is evident in practice, and 
emphasises that it is applicable not only across societies, but to moral disagreements present 
within individual societies. He considers that members of a society are continually 
negotiating and reconciling competing moral claims, even where they share certain 
significant moral beliefs. The value of accommodation is not, therefore, a radically new or 
different moral requirement:  
“a natural consequence of [recognising the value of other ways of life] is that one 
seeks to integrate at least some of [the] values one sees in other ways of life into one’s 
own commitments, and that this project of integration is not so different from what we 
do all along in attempting to reconcile the plurality of values typically present in our 
moralities.” (2006, p. 242) 
As this suggests, Wong also sees this accommodation as being more than passive acceptance 
of others’ views, and that it includes “an openness to be influenced by others, to bridge 
differences” (2006, p. 257), and entails an opportunity “to learn from them even if we do not 
desire to copy the paths they have taken” (2006, p. 260). Despite these sentiments, the value 
of accommodation suffers from the same problem as the value of tolerance, in that there are 
occasions where it does not override other values. Accordingly, some judgement is necessary 
to determine the situations in which accommodation is to be followed and those in which 
certain other values are maintained. Wong is unable to provide definitive guidance on how 
such judgement is to be exercised. 
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The Applicability of Tolerance or Accommodation 
As there are occasions when tolerance or accommodation are overridden by other values, 
whether one accepts or rejects a value of tolerance or accommodation would appear to be a 
subjective judgement, taking into account the circumstances of different situations and 
competing moral values. However, there are certain situations in which accommodation or 
tolerance would not override other moral values. If, for instance, we are faced with a choice 
between accommodating / tolerating and intervening in a situation where someone is 
inflicting needless cruelty on a group of defenceless people, there is little doubt that the value 
of accommodation or tolerance would be overridden. Similarly, although Wong considers the 
value of accommodation to be necessary in order to avoid repression, it is not clear that 
repression of certain values is always without merit. Wong does not suggest, for instance, that 
value systems that permit slavery, racism or gratuitous cruelty to humans should be 
accommodated (his focus is rather on competing value systems such as those that have 
developed in Western and Eastern nations).  
If a value of accommodation or tolerance is not always necessary, and if it must be cast aside 
when certain other values demand attention, the question of when exactly this value does play 
a role is relevant and important. With regards to issues such as slavery, racism and gratuitous 
cruelty to humans, it could be argued that neither accommodation or tolerance play a role as 
it can be demonstrated that these actions are either objectively immoral or that there is 
universal agreement that they are immoral (such a demonstration would highlight the 
competing, overriding values). As discussed above, questions of objectivity and universality 
are implicit in the claim of metaethical moral relativism, and the strength of the metaethical 
claim accordingly has direct implications for the value of accommodation or tolerance. 
Where there is little support for the claim of metaethical moral relativism (and where the 
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universality or objectivity of a judgement can be justified), then the value of accommodation 
or tolerance would carry little weight and may be overridden. Furthermore, if the claim of 
metaethical moral relativism is accepted by all parties on a certain issue, and yet one party 
insists on intervening in the behaviour of another then we would expect that party to provide 
some additional reason for their intervention, which could in turn lead to a re-evaluation of 
the metaethical claim.  
The value of tolerance or accommodation can provide a justifiable normative premise that is 
necessary to proceed from descriptive claims to the claim of normative moral relativism. 
Although these values may be overridden, and it is not always easy to identify the 
circumstances in which such a value is overriding, these values would be most applicable 
where the claim of metaethical moral relativism can be supported, as any competing values 
would then require further justification by those wishing to intervene. 
In the specific case of corporate governance, it was noted above that the claim of metaethical 
moral relativism can currently be justified (it is considered to be more plausible than the 
alternatives). This conclusion may be disputed by some parties, and additional arguments or 
evidence that challenge the claim of metaethical moral relativism would be relevant. Until 
such additional arguments or evidence are provided, however, and in the absence of any other 
reasons that could justify intervention, a value of tolerance or accommodation can 
accordingly be considered applicable and can be justified in relation to corporate governance.  
CONCLUSION: THE ARGUMENT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
Based on the discussions above, the following argument regarding moral relativism and 
corporate governance can be formulated: 
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(1) There is evidence of differences in certain moral judgements that are relevant to corporate 
governance (this descriptive claim is not discussed in this paper, but assumed based on 
the moral nature of corporate governance and the existence of different corporate 
governance models in practice); 
(2) More than one model of corporate governance can claim to be morally right or true (the 
metaethical claim); 
(3) Given 2., and in the absence of any other reasons justifying intervention, a value of 
tolerance or accommodation, which requires that one ought not to interfere with those 
who maintain different moral judgements, is applicable and can be justified.11 
Within the limits of the evidence and arguments supporting these premises, it is possible to 
conclude that it is morally wrong to impose a model of corporate governance where there are 
differences in moral judgements relevant to corporate governance, or to interfere with a 
model in similar circumstances. 
There are limitations to this argument. The first premise is empirical and has not been 
considered in any detail in this paper. Accordingly, the argument is only relevant where there 
are actually differences in moral judgements. The second premise, as noted above, is also 
subject to revision with the provision of additional empirical data and further moral 
arguments. This reflects the standpoint of the moral objectivist/universalist (that there is, in 
fact, a moral truth on this issue), and the argument would need revision if evidence and 
arguments stronger than those presented to date can be provided. The last premise is subject 
to the limitations of Wong’s arguments for tolerance and/or accommodation. This includes 
the acceptance of a moral philosophy in which a value of tolerance or accommodation is 
upheld, as well as the subjectivity that is necessarily involved in determining whether or not 
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(and the extent to which) such a value of tolerance or accommodation is justified when 
applied to corporate governance. This involves a consideration of competing values that may 
outweigh the value of tolerance or accommodation, but this criticism may also be mitigated 
when the strength of the argument for metaethical moral relativism is considered. 
Moral debates and dilemmas are typically characterised by conflicting points of view. While 
adherents to these views may regard their perspective as intuitive or even obvious, and others 
may remain undecided, it is important to examine the rational justification that can be put 
forward for the conflicting views.  This paper’s primary contribution lies in examining how 
the metaethical and normative claims of moral relativism could, rationally, be applied to 
corporate governance. While this examination has concluded with an argument justifying 
tolerance or accommodation, and while this conclusion may seem obvious to some, the result 
is a normative judgement that has some rational justification and the identification of 
limitations that reinforce the tentative nature of such a judgement.  
This argument contributes further, both theoretically and practically, in a number of ways. 
Theoretically, it contributes to the existing literature by extending West’s (2009) application 
of moral relativism to corporate governance, providing a more detailed examination of both 
the metaethical and normative claims associated with moral relativism and how they can be 
applied to corporate governance. This includes examining the metaethical claim by 
considering both (universally valid) objectivist and subjectivist alternatives that can be 
opposed to moral relativism. This also involved a consideration of how Wong’s work on 
moral relativism could be applied to corporate governance, firstly, in terms of providing an 
argument in support of the metaethical claim, and secondly in the provision of a value of 
accommodation or tolerance that is necessary to justify the normative claim. A link between 
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the value of accommodation or tolerance and the strength of the metaethical claim was also 
identified. 
The resulting argument has immediate implications for debates concerning convergence of 
corporate governance models around the world, but the approach adopted in this paper could 
also be applied to other issues in business ethics, particularly where there appear to be 
different practices in different parts of the world. This examination of metaethical and 
normative moral relativism could, for example, be applied to issues relating to supplier 
working conditions in developing countries, the use of child labour, or prescriptions 
regarding bribery or corruption. 
There are also a number of practical implications. Firstly, the conclusion of the argument – 
that it is morally wrong to impose a model of corporate governance where there are 
differences in moral judgements relevant to corporate governance, or to interfere with a 
model in similar circumstances, suggests (and, importantly, provides some justification for) a 
moral pluralism regarding models of corporate governance around the world. For countries 
with long-established models of corporate governance (and corporations operating within 
such jurisdictions), such a pluralism can encourage a greater appreciation of alternative moral 
perspectives and how they could be articulated within a model of corporate governance (that 
could in turn inform the development of their own existing practices). It could also provide 
cause for hesitation for those convinced of the moral superiority of a particular model. For 
developing and transitional countries, particularly those involved in ‘nation-building’ projects 
(see, for example, Ndiweni (2008)), this pluralism allows for the development of a model of 
corporate governance that best reflects the moral judgements prevalent in that jurisdiction 
(rather than uncritically adopting ‘best practice’ from other jurisdictions). Furthermore, the 
development of distinctive practices in countries such as China and India, as well other 
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developing countries, may present alternative claims to moral superiority that require further 
philosophical attention and that could then lead to revising the argument. 
This paper has contributed by providing an analysis of how the metaethical and normative 
claims of moral relativism can be applied to the issue of corporate governance. In an 
increasingly globalised world, where there is greater awareness of apparent differences in 
moral judgements, investigations into moral relativism with regard to specific issues are 
relevant. Consequently it is hoped that this may stimulate further inquiry and research in this 
area. 
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ENDNOTES 
1  Donaldson and Dunfee (1999b, p. 46) describe ‘hypernorms’ as “principles so fundamental that, by definition, 
they serve to evaluate lower-order norms, reaching to the root of what is ethical for humanity. They represent 
norms by which all others are to be judged” and can thus be considered to reflect a ‘universal’, non-relative 
morality. In contrast, ‘moral free space’ refers to the “moral differences that mark a culture’s distinctiveness” 
(1999b, p. 50). Although Donaldson and Dunfee do not advocate a general moral relativism (preferring the term 
‘pluralism’) their theory does reflect the distinction between universal and relative moral judgements. 
2 Forsyth et al. describe the relativism dimension in terms of “one’s emphasis on moral principles as guides for 
determining what is right and wrong” (2008, p. 815) and considers those who are highly relativistic to “base 
their appraisals on features of the particular situation and action they are evaluating” (2008, p. 815). This 
corresponds to Tsu’s description of moral particularists as those who “believe that the moral status of an action 
is not determined by moral principles; instead it always relies on the particular configuration of its contextual 
features” (2011, p. 388).  See also Dancy (2009). 
3 See Clarke (2007), Rossouw and Sison (2006) and Solomon and Solomon (2004) for detailed descriptions of 
how these models of corporate governance differ, as well as various national and regional perspectives on these 
models. Consistent with the approach of these authors, this paper focuses on the corporate governance of public 
companies. 
4 This paper follows Brandt (1967), Gowans (2012), Moser and Carson (2001) and Wong (1993) in 
distinguishing between different claims that are associated with moral relativism or aspects thereof, specifically 
the ‘descriptive’, ‘metaethical’ and ‘normative’ claims/aspects, as making such distinctions allows for greater 
conceptual clarity. Throughout this paper these are referred to as the descriptive/metaethical/normative claims of 
moral relativism, or simply as descriptive/metaethical/normative moral relativism. 
5  See MacIntyre (1985) for a more detailed discussion of the context of emotivism’s development and 
additional objections to emotivism as an adequate moral theory. 
6  Dewey’s pragmatism sought to apply the methods of inquiry that are prevalent in science to questions of 
morality, aesthetics, metaphysics and politics. Harrison describes Dewey’s position as requiring “the application 
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of intelligent inquiry, the self-correcting method of experimentally testing hypotheses created and refined from 
our previous experience” (R. Harrison, 1995a, p. 197). 
7  Falk (1953) analysed moral prescriptions and identified the reasoning implicit in moral imperatives such as 
those presented by emotivist accounts of morality. He concluded that these moral prescriptions are attempts “to 
teach someone to appreciate something” (1953, p. 171), and that, as such, they are both attempts at practical 
conversion and objective claims. 
8  This distinction remains where the shareholder model corresponds to an “Enlightened shareholder theory” 
(Tricker, 2012, p. 74), in which stakeholder interests are considered insofar as they contribute to the ultimate 
goal of enhancing shareholder wealth, as the ultimate goal is itself a point of contention. (See also the distinction 
between ‘instrumental’ and ‘normative’ stakeholder theory identified by Donaldson and Preston (1995)). 
9 A crude indication of the impact of these articles can also be obtained from the number of citations thereof (all 
figures obtained using Google Scholar, as at 23 September 2013): 
Evan and Freeman (1988): 942 citations (excluding reprints in later editions of  Beauchamp 
and Bowie (1988)) 
Freeman (1994):    1056 citations  
Friedman (1970):    6844 citations.  
Hansmann and Kraakman (2001):  1364 citations. 
10 Gowans (2012) defines descriptive moral relativism as the claim that “as a matter of empirical fact, there are 
deep and widespread moral disagreements across different societies, and these disagreements are much more 
significant than whatever agreements there may be.”  
11 Note that although this argument refers to claims associated with moral relativism and their application to 
corporate governance, it is not an argument for moral relativism, but an argument that tolerance and/or 
accommodation is applicable to this issue and, in this context, can be justified. 
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